Ultimate Acceptability, Cultural Bias, and an American Indian World: Reflections on Nelson Goodman by Norton-Smith, Thomas M.
Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 49, 2012 41-51
Ultimate Acceptability, Cultural Bias,  
and an American Indian World:  
Reflections on Nelson Goodman
Thomas M. Norton-Smith
Kent State University 
tnortons@kent.edu
Abstract
Nelson Goodman maintains that there is a plurality of internally consistent, equally privi-
leged, well-made actual worlds constructed through the use of very special symbol sys-
tems—right or ultimately acceptable world versions. Using evidence from American Indian 
traditions, I will argue that Goodman’s criteria for ultimately acceptability are culturally 
biased against any non-Western world version—especially a Native version. I will then 
offer a culturally sensitive interpretation of Goodman’s criteria for ultimate acceptability 
that an American Indian world version satisfies, and so is numbered among the internally 
consistent, equally privileged, well-made actual worlds.
Keywords: American Indians; constructivism; cultural bias; Goodman; ultimate accept-
ability; world versions.
Resumen. Aceptabilidad última, prejuicio cultural y un mundo nativo­americano: Reflexiones 
sobre Goodman
Nelson Goodman sostiene que hay una pluralidad de mundos internamente consistentes, 
igualmente privilegiados, bien construidos y reales que se erigen mediante el uso de siste-
mas simbólicos muy especiales, a saber, versiones de mundo correctas o en última instancia 
aceptables. Utilizando como evidencia algunas tradiciones de los indios americanos, argu-
mentaré que los criterios de Goodman para la aceptabilidad última están culturalmente 
sesgados en detrimento de cualquier versión del mundo no occidental, en particular, una 
versión nativa. Ofreceré entonces una interpretación culturalmente sensible de los criterios 
de Goodman para la aceptabilidad última satisfechos por una versión del mundo de los 
indios americanos, de modo que se cuente entre los mundos internamente consistentes, 
igualmente privilegiados, bien construidos y reales.
Palabras clave: Nativo Americanos; constructivismo; prejuicio cultural; Goodman; 
aceptabilidad última; versiones del mundo.
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1. Introduction
kiwaakomelepwa! nitesi8o Thomas Norton-Smith. saawanwa nilla no’ki ni 
m’soma peleawa. Greetings to you all! I am Thomas Norton-Smith. I am 
Turkey clan Shawnee Indian. These reflections recall and renew my recent 
book (Norton-Smith 2010), wherein I presented one possible interpretation 
of American Indian «philosophy» based upon a culturally sophisticated inter-
pretation of Nelson Goodman’s constructivism. 
Professor Goodman maintains that there is a plurality of internally con-
sistent, equally privileged, well-made actual worlds constructed through the 
use of very special symbol systems—right or ultimately acceptable world ver-
sions. I will gently suggest that Goodman’s criteria for ultimately acceptabili-
ty are culturally biased against any non-Western world version—especially an 
American Indian version. I will then offer a culturally sensitive interpretation 
of Goodman’s criteria for ultimate acceptability that an American Indian 
world version satisfies, and so should be numbered among the internally con-
sistent, equally privileged, well-made actual worlds. My remarks are not to be 
construed as a criticism of Goodman; indeed, it strikes me that far too many 
philosophers these days are gleefully and rudely critical of others.
2. Ultimate Acceptability and Well-made Worlds
Professor Goodman’s first fundamental insight is that «facts are fabricated,» 
that the notion of a mind-independent world of facts is mistaken (WW, 
91-107). As an illustration, I have often used my backyard bird feeder, visited 
on one particular occasion by a trio of cardinals. In our everyday way of thin-
king about the world, the «facts» are that there were three cardinals around 
the feeder; the cardinal atop the feeder was red; there was one natural kind 
— the cardinal — exemplified by the birds around the feeder; there were no 
persons around the feeder; it is the same feeder as the one I repaired last year; 
and, the feeder was not moving. These «facts» make true the corresponding 
statements about the red cardinals around my stationary feeder, and I know 
these things because my true beliefs are justified (Norton-Smith 2010, 17-19). 
Only quibblers, I think, would object. 
So, the statement, «The feeder was not moving» is true. It is striking, then, 
that according to NASA astrophysicists, I, my feeder, and its avian guests were 
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moving at 67,000 miles/hour, the speed at which the Earth races around the 
sun (NASA). One wonders, then, how two contradictory statements, «The 
bird feeder was not moving» and «The bird feeder was moving,» can be true 
in virtue of two competing facts. Goodman’s explanation is on the mark: Each 
of the statements is true relative to a different frame of reference—a version or 
description of the world. Under a geocentric frame of reference the feeder is 
not moving, and under a heliocentric frame of reference the feeder is moving 
(WW, 2). A «frame of reference»—a world version—is grounded in the cate-
gorization and ordering of sense experiences employing linguistic symbols; that 
is, a version of the world is grounded in the fabrication of facts through the 
devices of a language. There are no «bare facts» of the matter!1
The remarkable thing is that there are many possible versions of my back-
yard world that are consistent with my experiences, because the content of our 
sense experiences underdetermines how the world really is. Some of those 
alternative versions sound quite odd. For example, in a frame of reference 
wherein «red» is regarded as an intransitive verb like «moves,» then the state-
ment «The cardinal atop the feeder redded» is true, while «The cardinal atop 
the feeder was red» is not. In a frame employing the predicate «bleen»—where 
a thing is bleen if it is either blue or green—it is true that «The cardinal atop 
the feeder was not bleen.» In Goodman’s preferred nominalist frame, it is true 
that «There were three individual cardinals at the feeder,» but no fourth enti-
ty, the abstract natural kind they exemplified. «There was cardinal at the fee-
der» is true in a frame wherein «cardinal» is treated as a mass noun like «water.» 
Finally, in a Quinean (Quine 1981) sort of frame of reference wherein material 
objects come in temporal slices, it is false that «It was the same feeder I repai-
red last year.» These are some odd facts indeed, for most contradict our habit 
of thinking and talking about the world, our preferred linguistically categori-
zed and ordered frame of reference—but not one of them is inconsistent with the 
content of our sense experiences! 
I argued that some of these odd sounding «facts» are quite at home in 
American Indian world versions. Many American Indian languages like Shaw-
nee, lacking the verb «to be,» treat English adjectives like «red» as intransitive 
verbs (Wagar, pers. comm. See also Hester 2004, 264-5 and Cajete 2000, 
26-7). So, a Shawnee speaker commenting on my backyard scene might say 
«meci skwaawa,» expressing about the cardinals the fact that «They redded.» 
As well, the Shawnee stem «skipaky-» applies to a thing if it is either blue or 
green—or better said, if the thing bleens (Voegelin 1939, 314). And while 
«There were no persons around the feeder» is true in the Western version, 
1. The speciousness of the bare fact as an epistemological foundation is a common theme in 
constructivist thought, for the pure content of sense experiences alone underdetermines how 
the world really is. Indeed, as Goodman argues, one cannot even describe what the pure 
given might be apart from the order or structure imposed by a description, for a description 
must be employed in the account (WW, 6). Thus, the question whether my feeder was 
really moving or not is empty, for without a conceptualizing intellect utilizing a system of 
description, there was no fact.
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in the Native frame of reference the fact is that there were three persons around 
the feeder (Norton-Smith 2010, 21-22).
Since the content of our sense experiences underdetermines the way the 
world really is, there are many possible interpretations — world versions — of 
the events taking place in my backyard. In an English version, the cardinals 
were red; in a Shawnee version, they redded. But to say that «there are many 
possible interpretations» somewhat misrepresents Goodman’s view, for he 
famously argues for ontological pluralism, that there are many actual ontologi-
cally diverse, yet equally privileged constructed worlds2. Ontological pluralism 
rests upon the premise that all of the characteristics of the world — the things 
we understand to be objects and kinds — are relative to a particular model, 
theory, or version. This is nicely illustrated by the multiple isomorphic set-
theoretic reductions of the natural numbers. While the statement «The num-
ber 2 is {{φ}}» is true in Zermelo’s model, it is false in von Neumann’s, in 
which it is true that «The number 2 is {φ, {φ}}.» The question, «What is the 
number 2 really?» makes no sense.
Importantly, Goodman does not believe that all descriptions of the world 
are «true» or right. Indeed, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem guarantees that 
there are non-standard models of first-order number theory, but no non-stan-
dard model can be «true» or right. That is,
[The] willingness to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions 
does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as good as short ones, 
that truths are no longer distinguished from falsehoods, but only that truth 
must be otherwise conceived than as correspondence with a ready-made world. 
Though we make worlds by making versions, we no more make a world by 
putting symbols together than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces of 
wood together at random. The multiple worlds I countenance are just the 
actual worlds made by and answering to true or right versions. Worlds possi-
ble or impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no place in my 
philosophy. (WW, 94)
In the absence of truth construed as correspondence to theory independent 
facts, how does Goodman distinguish between «true» versions — versions that 
make actual worlds — and «false» versions that do not? True versions exhibit 
acceptability, a kind of rightness that is closely related but different from truth, 
and ultimate acceptability «serves as a sufficient condition for truth» (MM, 38). 
Ultimately acceptable versions satisfy a number of conditions or «standards of 
rightness»: deductive validity and inductive rightness, utility and simplicity, 
and non-emptiness. Now, these standards are not weighted equally when deter-
mining whether a version is acceptable. However, in Goodman’s view — and 
in mine as well — the violation of some of them renders a version unacceptable.
2. «What we often mistake for the actual world is one particular description of it. And what 
we mistake for possible worlds are just equally true descriptions in other terms. We have 
come to think of the actual as one among many possible worlds. We need to repaint that 
picture. All possible worlds lie within the actual one» (FFF, 57).
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First, Goodman maintains that «[a]mong the most explicit and clearcut 
standards of rightness we have anywhere are those for validity of a deductive 
argument» (WW, 125). That is, a version which violated the logical laws gover-
ning validity — a version in which one could deduce a statement and its 
negation — would be unacceptable. Indeed, every statement is deducible — must 
be true — in such a version!
Strong induction is the second standard of rightness, where inductive 
strength requires both the usual formal relations between premises and con-
clusions, but also right categorization. Think back to our earlier predicate 
«bleen» — or better still to our earlier Shawnee intransitive verb «skipaky-.» 
While the English predicate «green» is projectible, and past observations con-
firm the general hypothesis that all emeralds are green, «skipaky-» is not pro-
jectible in an English world version, so concluding that «skipaky- applies to all 
emeralds»—that is, «all emeralds either green or blue»—based upon past obser-
vations would be inductively weak, hence unacceptable. «skipaky­» wrongly 
categorizes experiences of color in the English world version. A long history of past 
inductive successes weights «green» more heavily than «skipaky-.» Clear evi-
dence, according to J. W. Powell, of American Indian «savagery»:
[I]n savagery ... blue and green are not differentiated, for the Indian sees but 
one color, and has but one name; the green grass and the blue heavens are of 
the same hue to the Indian eye. (Powell 1877, 4)
The utility of a theory or version is a third standard of rightness; indeed, 
nothing is more useful in Newtonian physics than the fictional frictionless 
plane or the myth of uniform three-dimensional space. But, our bridges tend 
not to fall down — especially in states with Democratic governors — thanks 
to the useful fictions of the physics of breadbox sized objects.
Simplicity, according to Goodman, is a fourth and pretty important stan-
dard of rightness for versions:
My insistence that simplicity is of the essence of science has sometimes been 
misinterpreted as the claim that simplicity is the only or the always-overriding 
factor in the choice of basis. Obviously, considerations such as brevity, clarity, 
convenience, familiarity, and utility for a special purpose usually enter also ... 
but these other factors, unlike simplicity and truth, are minor aids rather than 
major aims. A scientific system may be cumbersome, difficult, strange; but 
with no simplicity we have no system and no science at all. (PP, 277)
So, given two versions, the one that posits fewer primitive objects, relations, 
and complex processes is the more acceptable. Indeed, it was simplicity that 
gave the Copernican model of planetary motion a toehold in competition with 
its deeply entrenched Ptolemaic rival. 
Finally, Goodman’s constructivism suggests that there is one final and criti-
cally important standard for the rightness of a version: If a version speaks of 
objects or kinds that are empty — that organize or categorize no sense experiences 
whatsoever — then the version is unacceptable. Whether sense experiences are 
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categorized such that «The cardinals were red» is true or «The cardinals redded» 
is true — statements whose perceptual content is identical — there must be sense 
experiences to organize. I made the point using the following analogy: 
[T]he unstructured content of sense experience can no more be a world version 
than a rowdy gathering without rules of order can be a meeting. On the other 
hand, could we have a meeting with the rules of order in place, but without 
the gathering? Clearly not — the meeting hall would be empty. Likewise, a 
statement, theory, model or version is empty when there is no perceptual con-
tent to be identified, categorized, and organized by language. (Norton-Smith 
2010, 35)
No wonder Goodman rejects powers or dispositions, counterfactual assertions 
and other possibilia, as well as «neutrinos, angels, devils, and classes» — all 
notoriously imperceptible, and so empty notions (FFF, 33).
This all too brief treatment of Goodman’s standards of rightness is more 
extensively considered in Norton-Smith (2010). The important point here is 
that models, theories or versions that conflict with our deeply entrenched 
beliefs, accepted precepts, habits of mind and the evidence of perception will 
be unacceptable — hence «false.» On the other hand, world versions that 
satisfy at least Goodman’s more important standards of acceptability aspire to 
ultimate acceptability, and such versions construct well-made, actual worlds.
3. True Versions and Cultural Bias
We have noted Professor Goodman’s «willingness to accept countless alterna-
tive true or right world-versions» as well as his unwillingness to accept just any 
world version. «True» versions are ones that are extensionally isomorphic to 
an ultimately acceptable version, where the criteria or standards for ultimate 
acceptability include deductive validity and inductive rightness, utility, sim-
plicity and non-emptiness, i.e., having a basis in sense experience3. However, 
these standards are largely culturally determined, and so Goodman’s construc-
tivist account is biased against American Indian versions and worlds4.
3. Extensionally isomorphic versions may be ontologically diverse, but their overall global 
structures are preserved. See Norton-Smith (2010, 26-32).
4. Goodman (1964) anticipates a similar objection — the charge of «bigotry» — in an earlier 
defense of nominalism. «Nominalism is bigoted,» so goes the objection, in that its adoption 
is governed by a «supposed insight into its intrinsic merits and defects» and not by an appeal 
to «getting better results.» He answers:
The nominalist cannot demonstrate the need for the restrictions he imposes upon 
himself. He adopts the principle of nominalism in much the same spirit that he and 
others adopt the principle of extensionality or that logical philosophers in general 
adopt the law of contradiction. None of these is amenable to proof; all are stipulated 
as prerequisites of soundness in a philosophic system. They are usually adopted becau-
se a philosopher’s conscience gives him no choice in the matter. This does not mean 
that he need deny that he might some time change his mind. If ... pushe[d] ... hard 
enough, I will even concede that I might some day give up the law of contradiction 
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«Among the most explicit and clear cut standards of rightness we have 
anywhere,» according to Goodman, is valid deduction — as defined in Wes-
tern classical two-valued semantics — which assumes the laws of contradiction 
and excluded middle (WW, 125). Thus, this «most explicit and clear cut stan-
dard of rightness» — one that Goodman’s conscience «gives him no choice in 
the matter» (PP, 170) — begs the question against any other «nonstandard» 
logics as standards of rightness. I find this odd, since a constructivist like 
Goodman ought to recognize that, since, patterns are where you find them, 
and a logic is just another way to organize and categorize experiences, there are 
many possible logics that could be employed, e.g., intuitionist logics, which 
embrace the law of contradiction, but deny the law of the excluded middle. 
To our point, Goodman’s standard of valid deduction is biased against Ame-
rican Indian versions and worlds.
Anne Waters (2004a, 97-99) explains that Native thought is framed by a 
logic decidedly different from Western logics—a nondiscrete complementary 
dualist logic. Such logics welcome male/female, good/evil, and animate/inani-
mate dualisms, but, being nonbinary, these dualisms are not regarded as 
opposites. Moreover, in such logics where dualisms are complementary, it 
may be the case that something is both p and not-p at the same time in the 
same sense, without one excluding the other. For example, a person may have 
elements of male and female at the same time — without the one excluding 
the other. Good and evil can — and often do — simultaneously reside in the 
same event. Goodman would most certainly deem unacceptable a logic that 
denies the law of the excluded middle — and especially the law of contradic-
tion — unless «pushed hard enough» (PP, 170). But then, my remarks are 
only a «gentle suggestion.»
Goodman’s standard of inductive rightness is no less biased against Ame-
rican Indian processes of induction, for the formal relations between premises 
and conclusions required for the strong inductive inferences — strong by 
Western lights, that is — are, like their deductive counterparts, culturally 
biased against nonstandard processes of projection. For, every informal logic 
text teaches that strong inductive generalizations require well-established regu-
larities — and the better the regularity, the stronger the projection into the 
future. Who would seriously question that all men are mortal, that all emeralds 
are green, or that fire burns uncovered skin? However, American Indian pro-
cesses of projection are more cautious, for two reasons. The first — and the 
most fundamental way that Native people organize and categorize experiences 
— is the conviction that «everything is related.» Second, Indians believe that 
the world is not inert and mechanistic, fixed and finished, but is, instead, 
animate, creative, and constantly unfolding (Norton-Smith 2010, 45-49).
in the interests of getting better results — although if I should give up the law I am 
puzzled about what the difference would then be between getting results and not get-
ting results.» (PP, 169-170)
 My similar objection is that Goodman’s standards for ultimate acceptability—while «intrin-
sically meritorious» by his lights — are culturally biased against Native world versions.
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First, because all entities and events in the Native constructed world are 
related, the process of categorization necessary for right inductions constantly 
evolves. They actively search for newly emergent, previously overlooked, unex-
pected, and strikingly unusual connections between experiences, employing 
what I call relatedness as a world ordering principle. According to Lakota Vine 
Deloria, Jr. the Pawnee had discovered a plant-plant relationship, using the 
milkweed as an indicator plant to tell how their corn crop was progressing 
some two weeks away. I would say that in the Pawnee world version there was a 
useful relationship constructed between milkweed and corn maturing experiences 
(Deloria 1999b, 35).
 Second, the predominant Western ontological assumption about the phy-
sical world is that it is material and inanimate, mechanical and rational, ame-
nable to quantitative description and governed by fixed physical laws. It is 
orderly, fixed, and finished. No wonder the principle of induction — that very 
well-established regularities will extend into unobserved regions of space and 
time — is a premise in right induction. However, the Native version constructs 
a world that is creative and animate, dynamic and interconnected, unfixed and 
unfinished. In such a world it would be somewhat reckless to extend even the 
best verified regularity — to project the most well-entrenched predicate —into 
the future with unflinching confidence. How could the mortality of every past 
human being preclude the mortality of every future one in a dynamic and 
unfolding world? (Deloria 1999a, 50). 
Utility, as a standard for the ultimate acceptability of a theory or version is 
no less culturally informed, for within the context of any frame of reference 
one must ask, «Useful for whom and for what purpose?» A very useful version 
for the Western tradition, which constructs an inert and material, law-like and 
mechanical, but a sometimes threatening natural world, is the one that best 
enables us to explain and predict, and then conquer, manipulate and exploit 
it5. However, Indians are not as concerned with conquering and manipulating 
the natural world as finding «the proper road along which, for the duration of 
a person’s life, individuals [are] supposed to walk» (Deloria 1999a, 46). The 
useful version, then, in a world Deloria terms a «moral universe,» is a norma­
tive one. It does not look at the world as an inert natural resource and ask 
«How can I predict, manage, or defeat this?» Instead, it sees a living commu-
nity in which human beings participate and asks «How should I behave?» 
So, like the deductive and inductive rightness of world versions, utility as a 
criterion of ultimate acceptability is culturally determined.
Returning to our consideration of Goodman’s standards for the accepta-
bility of a world version, I offer a brief and dismissive critique of simplicity: 
There is no non­question begging argument that the best version of the world will 
5. Indeed, when considering whether the pragmatists’ proposal that truth should be interpreted 
in terms of utility, Goodman muses that «[t]he thesis that true statements are those that 
enable us to predict or manage or defeat nature has no little appeal» (WW, 122-123; emphasis 
added).
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be the simplest one. For, a realist ought to believe that science should discover 
that the natural world is simple, not assume that it is, and a constructivist’s 
choice of the simplest theory from among rivals reflects more an aesthetic pre­
ference than a robust standard of acceptability — «the more elegant theory is 
the more acceptable.» But what could be more culturally informed than one’s 
aesthetic preferences? (Norton-Smith 2010, 50-51).
Unlike deductive validity and inductive rightness, utility and simplicity 
— all of which have cultural components, interpretations, or understandings — 
whether or not a world version is empty is not culturally determined. Indeed, 
Goodman is exactly right that one cannot construct a world without sense 
experiences to identify and organize. Western philosophers often use words 
without creating a world — consider Platonic «forms,» Cartesian «causality,» 
and Lockean «natural rights.» But such empty versions do not construct well-
made worlds. And while space now prohibits a full development of the claim, 
I argue at length that an American Indian world version is not empty — even 
in its use of the term «manitooki,» translated as «spirits»! (Norton-Smith 2010, 
86-88).
4. An American Indian Well-made Actual World
I have argued that Goodman’s standards for the ultimate acceptability of a 
world version — deductive validity and inductive rightness, utility and sim-
plicity — are culturally informed or determined. By these standards, only 
Western world versions are ultimately acceptable; only Western world versions 
construct well-made actual worlds. Non-Western versions embracing different 
notions of deduction or induction, a different sense of utility, or that posit 
complex relationships between vast numbers or bizarre kinds of primitive enti-
ties are unacceptable, hence give rise to ill-made or impossible worlds. I belie-
ve, by the way, that Professor Goodman would not disagree with this 
assessment.
However, this kind of «cultural superiority» — the «natural» conviction 
that one’s own familiar tradition is the only correct one — is difficult to jus-
tify. I propose, then, that we interpret these standards for ultimate acceptabi-
lity in a culturally sophisticated way that recognizes their inherent bias. In 
judging whether or not a world version satisfies standards for rightness we 
should consider for whom the world version is ultimately acceptable, introducing 
the notion of a cultural frame of reference. Goodman provides standards of 
ultimate acceptability for a 20th century Western analytic philosopher — but 
they are not the standards acceptable for a traditional Shawnee Indian. So, 
when judging deductive and inductive rightness, we determine whether infe-
rences are consistent with the principles of deduction and inductions adopted 
within that particular cultural frame of reference. When judging utility, we ask 
whether a version achieves a purpose or goal informed by the cultural frame. 
Before requiring simplicity, we consider the aesthetic standards in the cultural 
frame. Of course, emptiness is not culturally determined, so a culturally sophis-
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ticated reinterpretation of Goodman’s standards will not sanction the cons-
truction of an actual world with an empty version. 
In the view I advance, a version satisfying these culturally informed stan-
dards will be ultimately acceptable within a cultural frame, and so will cons-
truct a well-made actual world. Anyway, all world versions — frames of refe-
rence — are cultural frames of reference:
[I]ndeed, all that we have done here is to make explicit the implicit cultural 
nature of a version. Facts are fabricated, but the fabrication takes place within 
a linguistically informed tradition; I see a red cardinal atop my feeder, but not 
a cardinal redding atop the feeder. And what could be more culturally infused 
and determined than the linguistic frame of reference in which statements, 
theories and models are embedded? (Norton-Smith 2010, 53)
I argued in Norton-Smith (2010) that an American Indian world version 
satisfies this culturally sophisticated reinterpretation of Goodman’s standards, 
and so is ultimately acceptable within a Native cultural frame of reference. Thus, 
an American Indian world will be numbered among the internally consistent, 
equally privileged, well-made actual worlds, and so it is worthy of philosophical 
treatment — and respect — from the Western perspective. In a Native world, 
sense experiences are organized and categorized — objects and kinds are cons-
tructed — employing at least four world constructing principles that seem to 
recur across American Indian traditions — relatedness, circularity, an expansive 
conception of persons, and the semantic potency of performance. While there 
is neither ample time nor space to explore these themes now, I cannot end 
without expressing admiration for and gratitude to Professor Goodman.
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